Animal ethics based on friendship

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Abstract
This paper discusses some aspects of animal ethics from an Aristotelian virtue ethics point of view. Since the notion of friendship (philia) is central to Aristotle’s ethical theory, the focus of the paper is whether humans and animals can be friends. It is argued that new empirical findings in cognitive ethology indicate that animals actually do fulfil the Aristotelian condition for friendship based on mutual advantage. The practical ethical implications of these findings are discussed and it is argued that eating meat from wild animals is more morally acceptable than eating cattle, since hunters (unlike farmers) do not befriend their prey.

1 Introduction
The debate over animal welfare has been heavily influenced by Peter Singer’s utilitarian analysis and Tom Regan’s rights-based theory of ethics.1 This paper seeks to make a contribution to the field by exploring the ethical obligations humans have towards animals from a fundamentally different ethical perspective -- that of virtue ethics. Our main conclusion is that the basic ideals of virtue ethics give us strong reasons to take animal welfare seriously and to treat them as our friends.

A fundamental idea in Aristotle’s ethics is that a person’s moral obligations toward friends differ from those she has toward people in general. Friends have a
special moral status and as a result they are to be favoured over strangers. Therefore, it is of great interest to explore whether humans can be friends with animals. As has been pointed out by his critics, Aristotle’s himself thought that animals are inferior to humans and that their souls are radically different.

Take for example the relation of craftsman to tool, and soul to body. The latter in each pair is benefitted by its user, but there is neither friendship not justice towards soulless things. Nor is there any towards an ox, or even a slave, in so far as he is a slave; for master and slave have nothing in common, since a slave is a tool with a soul, while a tool is a slave without one.²

This paper seeks to challenge Aristotle’s claim that we cannot befriend animals. We do this by summarising some recent empirical findings from cognitive ethology, indicating that animals in fact have the capacities that would qualify them for certain types of friendship. We also argue that a revised opinion about the possibility of befriending animals has significant ethical implications for issues related to animal welfare, some of which are more nuanced than the rather blunt views put forward by Singer and Regan.

Take, for instance, the question of whether it is morally permissible to eat meat. Singer and Regan famously claim that this is wrong. Singer bases his argument on a utilitarian calculus of what would produce the greatest amount of preference satisfaction, whereas Regan argues that we should ascribe inviolable rights to animals.³ However, if friends are of greater moral importance than others, and animals could be our friends, a different view seems to present itself. Since farmers are, or ought to be, friends with their cattle it is morally worse to produce beef than to
hunt for wild animals. This is because the hunter is not standing in any friendship-relationship with his prey. The upshot of this is, thus, that if we accept Aristotle’s basic premise that our moral obligations towards friends differ from those towards strangers, it can be claimed that it is less morally wrong, or even morally acceptable, to eat meat from wild animals.

The reminder of this article is divided into four sections. Sections 2 and 3 outline the role of friendship in Aristotle’s ethical theory. In Section 4 it is argued that humans can befriend (non-human) animals, and that animals can befriend each other. Finally, in Section 5 we outline the ethical implications of our claim about human-animal friendship. We argue that a virtue ethics approach to the discussion over animal welfare supports the claim that it is morally worse to eat meat from farms than hunted wild animals.

2 Aristotle on friendship

Aristotle argued that the supreme good for any individual is *eudaimonia* and, further to that point, that friendship (*philia*) is an essential part of *eudaimonia*. He explains that for any agent to lead a happy life she needs friends and other people close to her. With the possible exception of *theoria* (contemplation, study) the shared life is always superior - it is better to engage in practical activities with a friend than to do it on one’s own. Aristotle writes,

Presumably it is also absurd to make the blessed person solitary. For no one would choose to have all [other] goods and yet be alone, since a human being is a political [animal], tending by nature to live together with others.
The paradigm case of friendship for Aristotle is a relationship that is mutually recognized and taking place between two adult humans of equal standing. What they admire and love about each other are the virtues they can see in one another. As will be discussed later, however, Aristotle can be taken to concede that relationships between the not fully virtuous may also be called friendship but of a lesser kind. The most important aspect of friendship is spending time together, preferably engaging in *theoria* - this is the signum of the good friendship. Complete friendship helps us grow as humans and virtuous beings as our friends inspire and help us. Both parties gain self-knowledge, “we are able to observe our neighbours more than ourselves, and to observe actions more than our own”. By watching our friend, our other self and a mirror, as it were, we discover ourselves. This is an ongoing process; we change when going through life and therefore we must maintain our friendships not to lose track of ourselves. As Sherman succinctly puts it, “friendship creates a context or arena for the expression of virtue and ultimately for happiness”.

Seeing what weight Aristotle places on having friends, it does not come as a surprise that we have special moral obligations to our near and dear. To treat friends better than others is not only permissible but actually expected of the virtuous agent. Aristotle writes that we have a moral obligation to help our friends before we help strangers. Indeed, it is difficult to see how we would be able to create and maintain the type of very close relationships he is after if we were compelled to neutrality.

Aristotle explicitly claims that you may favour your friends both in everyday situations and in instances when helping a friend is especially fine or necessary. Although reluctant to dictate universal rules, he offers some examples of situations where partiality would be morally compulsive. One such case is the ransoming of one’s father if captured (even before paying one’s own ransom). We should give
priority to our parents when it comes to offering support because our debt to them is greater than that we might have to others.\textsuperscript{12} That said, Aristotle does not provide and excuse for rampant nepotism. It would \textit{not} be acceptable to favour someone close who is not virtuous over a good man.

Aristotle argued that there are three main qualities for which someone qualifies as a friend: excellence, pleasantness and usefulness. He then moves on to saying that these translate into three types of friendships (which can, of course, overlap).\textsuperscript{13}

1. friendship based on mutual admiration
2. friendship based on mutual pleasure
3. friendship based on mutual advantage

Aristotle argues that the first kind of friendship is superior to the other two because it is based on excellence. It deals with the inner qualities of a person in these situations we love our friend for intrinsic reasons and not solely as a road to pleasure and utility. However, this does not entail that the two other forms of friendship lack ethical significance. In our discussion of friendship with animals, it will be argued that humans and animals are friends in the third sense, i.e. their friendship is based on mutual advantage.

\textbf{3 The possibility of lesser friendships}

Let us then briefly address the issue of what support there might be for the idea that a friendship which is not based on mutual admiration indeed could be ethically significant. Let us turn to Book VIII of the NE. Here Aristotle concludes that the
lesser forms should still be called friendship because he says there are different kinds of friendship.

For in so far as there is something good, and [hence] something similar to [what one finds in the best kind], people [in the incomplete friendships] are friends; for what is pleasant is good to lovers of pleasure.14

Evidently this can be read as saying that even the lesser friendships include an element of genuine love and goodwill. On our reading Aristotle maintains that relationships based on usefulness or pleasure still count as friendships because even though the lesser forms of friendship do not contain all the right elements they contain enough elements to make them count. This is a contested conclusion, however. In the contemporary literature it has been questioned whether the lesser forms of friendship should actually count as (ethically relevant forms of) friendship. The positions range from blatant rejection of the lesser forms to inclusive views where the friendships of utility and pleasure are subject to various forms of qualification.15

Cooper (1977) puts forward a rather optimistic view claiming that Aristotle saw genuine goodwill and elements of unselfishness and concern for the other in all three forms of friendship.16 The basis of this interpretation is the definition of love and friendship found in the Rhetoric (Book 2.4). The general idea is that loving your friend is “wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about”.17 According to Cooper, Aristotle would argue that not even the lesser friendships are entirely self-centred, that there is genuine concern for the other for his own sake, and on that basis even these relationships merit to be called friendships.
Other scholars, e.g. Price (1989), have criticized Cooper’s view and pointed out that Aristotle had many different formulations in the Rhetoric, the Eudemeian Ethics and the NE. Sometimes Aristotle appears to support the idea that there is goodwill in all friendships and on other occasions he seems to reject it. Further to that point, Price says that what Cooper believes to be goodwill in the lesser friendships is in fact merely the much weaker feeling of well-wishing. That is the impersonal, non-committing, unspecified benign attitude we might well feel towards the whole human race.

Cooper might then respond by pointing out that Aristotle recognizes that there clearly is a difference between lesser friends and those who just happen to have a joint interest and it is between those two groups that the division lies. Cooper writes that,

>a businessman is no friend of all his regular customers, and when a personal relationship is more or less purely exploitative it would be taken for irony to describe the persons in question as friends.18

It appears that Cooper is saying that there are three levels, two which qualify as friendships and then the rest.19 Cooper concludes that the ‘perfect friendship’ as described by Aristotle is just a paradigm case – that is not the only kind of friendship. Even though we might have to settle for the lesser forms all is not lost; also those forms contain genuine well-wishing and goodwill for the sake of the other. We find this a very plausible interpretation. Anyone seeking to make constructive use of Aristotle’s ideas would find it helpful to adopt the position that he created paradigm cases in the interest of clarity and not because he believed that the only thing that counts are the perfect instances. Presumably, Aristotle thought both pure friendship
and the fullness of virtue very rare. Although that does not make those states less beautiful or less admirable it does mean that perfection is not the only way, we can still have friendship in a lesser way.

Of course, accepting that lesser friendship is indeed a qualified form of friendship is not to deny that it still requires a certain degree of mutuality. Both parties have to be aware of the relationship and they must both harbour similar attitudes towards each other. This point will become important in the following two sections, in which we discuss friendship with animals.

4 Friendship with animals

The analysis of non-human friendship can be broken down into two separate questions. The first is whether humans can be friends with (some) animals; and the second is whether (some) animals can be friends with other animals. For reasons that will become clear shortly we shall analyse both questions in parallel, although they might very well prompt different answers.

Aristotle does not discuss friendship with animals in great detail. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that he considered it impossible for humans to be friends with animals. His argument runs as follows.

Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; for man is naturally inclined to form couples even more than to form cities, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary than the city, and reproduction is more common to man with the animals. With the other animals the union extends only to this point, but human beings live together not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the various purposes of life; for from the start the
functions are divided, and those of man and woman are different; so they help each other by throwing their peculiar gifts into the common stock.21

The main point of the argument appears to be that friendship among animals is impossible because animals merely meet up to reproduce but do not live together for “the various purposes of life”. Humans, on the other hand, do indeed “live together” for “the various purposes of life”.

Arguably, the kind of friendship that might be applicable here is the third type listed in Section 2, viz. friendship based on mutual advantage. Although not as valuable as friendship based on mutual admiration (the first category), this should still be recognized as a form of friendship, as argued in Section 3. Now, for the sake of the argument we shall grant Aristotle the claim that his empirical observation about the behaviour of animals, if true, is ethically relevant. Friendship based on mutual advantage requires, among other things, interaction and communication, since this is required for sharing “the various purposes of life”. However, as indicated above, Aristotle’s argument comprises two parts, an ethical as well an empirical one. So far we have only considered the ethical part and we must now turn to the empirical part. We believe that one may coherently accept Aristotle’s ethical claim about the ethical significance of communication and interaction and deny his empirical claim that animals actually lack these capacities. In other words, although we find the ethical part of the argument reasonable it does not follow that its empirical part is true. In fact, modern biology has shown Aristotle’s biological claims to be false. Today we know that he greatly underestimated the degree to which some animals live together for “the various purposes of life”. Lions, zebras, reindeers, and many other species live together in herds for long periods of time, and some birds live in life-long
relationships. We also know that many animals, such as dolphins and chimpanzees, are able to communicate with each other and transfer information from one individual to another.

Further to this point, an entirely new branch of ethology known as cognitive ethology has gained considerable ground in recent years. In their book *The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition* (2002), Bekoff, Allen and Burghardt have put together 57 papers written by leading experts on animal cognition. The authors show that the empirical evidence for animal cognition and communication is massive. In one of the papers, “Exploring the Cognitive World of the Bottlenosed Dolphin”, Herman reports what we currently know about the cognitive capacities of these mammals. He points out that the brain of the adult bottlenose dolphin is about 25% heavier than the average adult human brain. Moreover, according to Herman, “recent work has demonstrated that the cerebellum is involved in cognitive processing in addition to its role in motor control.” For example, Herman mentions that “our studies of language understanding have revealed dolphin capabilities for processing both semantic and syntactic information” and that “our studies have shown that immediate memory for things seen … and for sounds heard … are each of high fidelity and endurance.” Further to the first of these two points, Herman puts great emphasis on the language skills of dolphins:

The primary syntactic device used in our language studies has been word order. The dolphin is capable of understanding that word order changes meaning. It can respond appropriately, for instance, to such semantic contrasts as *surfboard person fetch* (take the person to the surfboard) and *person surfboard fetch* (take the surfboard to the person). In these language studies, the dolphin demonstrated
an implicit representation and understanding of the grammatical structure of the
language. For example, the language-trained dolphin *Akeakamai* was able to
understand logical extensions of a syntactic rule spontaneously … and was able
to extract a semantically and syntactically correct sequence from a longer
anomalous sequence of language gestures given by the human. (Herman
2002:276)

In another paper in the same volume by Bekoff *et al* entitled, “Gestural
Communication in Olive Baboons and Domestic Dogs”, Smuts shows that baboons as
well as dogs communicate through gestures, and that such gestures play an important
role for the social interaction that can be observed in dogs and baboons. In another
paper, “Field Studies of Social Cognition in Spotted Hyenas” Holekamp and Engh
report empirical findings on the social cognition of hyenas. Although some social
cognition is reported, it appears that hyenas – unlike monkeys – cannot recognize
third-party social relationships. The authors also discuss the hypothesis that hyenas
might be able to count (“how many puppies should be moved to the new den?”), but
conclude that the observed behaviour is more readily explained by assuming that
hyenas use less sophisticated rules of thumb rather that arithmetic for keeping track of
their puppies. A fourth example is Slobodchikoff’s paper, “Cognition and
Communication in Prairie Dogs”, which summaries our knowledge of the cognitive
and communicative abilities of prairie dogs.

From a philosophical perspective it could, of course, be questioned whether
non-human animals really *talk* to each other and *believe* what they hear in the strictest
sense of these words. Empirical data suggest that cognitive processes in non-human
animals are more primitive than in humans. However, no expert in cognitive ethology
would deny that many (non-human) animals do indeed communicate, although their methods are of course slightly different from ours. It is an undisputable empirical fact that animals transfer information between each other. Furthermore, we also know for sure that many animals live together “for the various purposes of life” in ways that are not dissimilar from the ways humans do.

Faced with these new empirical findings it might, of course, be objected that although some animals do live together and communicate with their herd or partner, only humans do all these things to a sufficiently high degree or in the right way. Humans can read and write and philosophise. Animals, on the other hand, can communicate about immediate danger and fear but not make plans for the future or philosophise about the Gettier problem. We believe the best response to this objection is to acknowledge that friendship comes in different forms. As already stressed above, friendship based on mutual advantage is not as valuable as friendship based on mutual admiration. However, the former kind of friendship is nevertheless morally significant, and animals can surely communicate and interact to a sufficiently high degree to be of mutual advantage to each other. (Some animals can be of mutual advantage to each other without being able to communicate or interact, but since all forms of friendship require cognitive process mutual advantage does not in itself suffice for friendship.) We thus propose that when confronted with the new empirical findings in cognitive ethology Aristotle’s categorization could be revised by introducing two new sub-forms of friendship, viz. friendship between humans and animals and friendship between animals. Both of these qualify as friendship based on mutual advantage as they share many common characteristics, but since they also differ in certain respects they form two distinct sub-categories.
We do not claim that these new sub-forms of friendship are exactly similar to the forms of friendship described by Aristotle, nor do we claim that these sub-forms of friendship are equally important as other forms of friendship. Our modest proposal is that since many animals fulfil the ethically relevant condition to some degree, i.e. have cognitive capacities and are able to communicate and “live together” for “the various purposes of life” and are thus of mutual advantage to each other and to us, it ought to be acknowledged that the relationships that holds between some animals and humans, and between some pairs of animals, are two novel forms of friendship, and moreover, that they are ethically significant. To be more precise, these two novel forms of friendship obtain whenever the following conditions are satisfied:

(i) The relationship is of mutual advantage to both parties, and

(ii) The mutual advantage arises out of a capacity to communicate and interact with the other individual.

5 The moral significance of non-human friendship

In our ethical analysis we shall leave aside whether friendship between an animal and another animal is of any moral significance. The issue to be analysed here is what follows, if anything, from the claim that some animals can be friends with humans. Since virtue ethics is a strongly context-dependent ethical theory it does not lend itself to the creation of a great many rules. As a result, the virtue ethicist has to make a number of further assumptions about the situation at hand when seeking to find out what a virtuous person ought to do in a particular situation.

To start with, consider Joe and his dog Buster. Joe and Buster are friends and share some aspects of life. They are certainly of mutual advantage to each other - they
live together and enjoy spending time together. To some extent, Joe and Buster also communicate. Buster is able to tell Joe about his needs (“hunger!”) and immediate beliefs (“danger!”), and Joe is sometimes able to instruct Buster how to behave (“sit!”). Moreover, Joe and Buster both look after each other, but in different ways. Joe ensures that Buster gets some healthy food to eat every day, as well as some fresh air and physical exercise. Buster, on the other hand, protects Joe from burglars and alleviates his boredom. However, Joe and Buster do of course not share everything in life, nor do they communicate about philosophy. If Joe is to lead a eudaimon life he has to treat Buster well. Therefore, it would be morally wrong to neglect Buster, or beat him. In most cases it would also be wrong kill him, unless Buster’s own wellbeing is at risk. (Arguably, Joe would be under an obligation to kill Buster in a situation in which that would prevent him from severe suffering for the rest of her life.)

Let us contrast the first scenario with a slightly different one, in which Mary the farmer owns a cow called Rose. Mary and Rose are not as close friends as Joe and Buster, because Mary has many cows of which Rose is just one. However, Mary and Rose are certainly of mutual advantage to each other. If Rose were to die that would spell trouble for Mary, and vice versa. Moreover, Mary and Rose adjust their behaviour according to the signals received from the other. Mary cares about Rose’s wellbeing, and this caring attitude is not merely an instrumental one. To some extent, Mary and Rose are friends, although this friendship relation is of course somewhat weaker than that between Joe and Buster. That said, we believe it would be wrong for Mary to treat Rose in a purely instrumental sense. Mary has a moral obligation to ensure that her cattle lead a good life according to the standards applicable to cows.
So is it always wrong for a farmer to kill her cattle? Apart from the type of cases considered above, in which the animal would face severe suffering that could not be prevented in other ways, it could be argued that farmers do indeed have a moral duty not to kill their friends prematurely. Since friends have a duty to look after each other, and virtuous farmers are friends with their cattle, farmers are under an obligation to promote the happiness of their cattle. Without speculating as to the inner lives of e.g. cows it appears reasonable to assume that a good life for a cow would involve things such as loving care and attention, the possibility to graze outside, good quality and ample amounts of feed, interaction with other cows and so on. Although our argument does not rule out the framer killing the animal at some point this is definitely an argument against, for example, the current practice of killing male dairy calves. Further to that point, it also follows that farmers ought not to give their cattle steroids, hormones or other drugs which are intended to speed up growth or make the animal develop in extreme ways.

Note that our analysis places stronger moral obligations on the farmer than on the consumer, since the consumer is in most cases not friend with the cattle. That said, we can extend the analysis to the consumer in the following way: Given that it is rather difficult to be virtuous in a vicious society it might be in the interest of virtuous agents to forward virtue both in society at large and in their fellow citizens. Thus, by abstaining from eating meat – if this would involve the killing of e.g. calves for that very purpose – the virtuous might not only aid cattle farmers in their quest to become more virtuous but in bringing about a virtuous society.

Naturally, not all farmers are as virtuous as Mary and as a result they may fail to actually be friends with their cattle. However, this is a moral deficit of these farmers, which does not alleviate them of their moral responsibility. Given that someone, e.g.
Rose the cow, is dependent on the farmer and communicates her needs on a daily basis, and the farmer is also dependent on Rose, the farmer has a moral obligation to treat his or her cattle as friends.23

Let us finally consider a third scenario, which differs in important ways from the others. Suppose that John the hunter is hunting for moose. Luckily for John, a moose appears out of the woods just as John has loaded his rifle. John has never met this particular moose before, so the moose is by no means his friend; in fact, humans are typically not friends with moose. This is because moose live on their own in the woods and are by not dependent on humans for their survival. Humans and moose are not of mutual advantage to each other. Furthermore, humans and moose do not communicate, not even in a weak sense. So would it be wrong for John to pull the trigger and shoot the moose? It follows from what has been said above that the answer might very well be No. Since John is not shooting a friend, and the moose will die immediately without feeling any fear or pain, it follows that there is an important moral distinction between the present case the two previous ones.

Note that we do not claim that it is always permissible to kill animals who do not belong to your circle of friends. One might of course have other good reasons for not killing an animal. Virtue ethics does not permit us to totally neglect the interests of others. All we are claiming is that there is a morally significant distinction to be drawn between animals who are our friends and animals with whom we have not established any friendship relation. We have moral obligation to our friends that we do not have to strangers.

In an earlier paper on animal welfare and friendship, Jordan argues that humans can indeed befriend certain animals.24 However, contrary to what we have argued, Jordan maintains that there is no morally relevant distinction between hunting for wild
animals and eating cattle. This is because on Jordan’s account the morally relevant feature of friendship is whether it is possible for humans to befriend a kind of animals, not whether a friendship-relation has actually been established with a particular animal. Therefore, since he maintains that it would be possible for a hunter to befriend e.g. a moose he arrives at a much more extreme conclusion than ours, holding that hunting is in general wrong. Let us take a closer look at this alternative view. Jordan explicitly claims that, “[f]or any animal-kind K, such that members of K are possible friends of humans, no member of K is a morally permissible normal human food-stuff”.25 Although Jordan does not mention moose, it is clear from his discussion that he believes that it is possible for humans to befriend a moose, although the kind of friendship he has in mind is not one of three (symmetric) kinds discussed by Aristotle. In response to this, we would like to point out that we find merely possible friendship ethically irrelevant. For Aristotle, as well as for contemporary advocates of his theory, it is clear that the whole point about friendship is that one actually is someone’s friend. Moral obligations based on friendship arise because we do actually admire, take pleasure, or benefit from each other’s company, not because it would be possible to do so. This is why eating meat from wild animals is in general morally better than eating cattle.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that the analysis sketched above can be applied to other cases as well. For example, fishermen catching fish or lobster do not catch their friends, because there is no cognitive interaction going on between fish and fishermen, nor are the fishermen of any advantage to the fish. It thus seems to follow that, from the virtue ethics perspective sketched here, catching and eating fish is morally acceptable. Another example worth thinking about is animals used in research. Even if it might be true to some extent that researchers and animals
sometimes communicate, it is an undisputable fact that these animals are not friends with the researcher. This is because the condition of mutual advantage is not fulfilled. The animals do not gain anything from being used by the researchers.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we have explored whether humans can have non-humans friends, and whether non-human animals can be friends with each other. By approaching the issue from an Aristotelian virtue ethical point of view, we have outlined a novel argument for thinking that humans can indeed be friends with animals and that animals can be friends with each other. Moreover, we have also argued that the conclusion about human-animal friendship is of ethical significance, since (many) humans are moral agents. From a virtue ethical point of view, it seems clear that it is in many cases wrong to kill or maltreat ones friends. This opens up for a novel way of articulating a moral distinction between eating meat from cattle and meat from wild animals: Since farmers are, or ought to be, friends with their cattle while a hunter does typically not befriend his prey, it is morally worse to eat cattle.
References


Endnotes

1 See Singer (1975) and Regan (1983).

2 NE1161b1-b4

3 See Singer (1975) and Regan (1983).

4 Which more concrete obligations that could follow from this type of friendship is further discussed in section 5 of this paper.

5 NE1169b10-15.

6 NE 1169 b16-20

7 NE 1157b19-24.

8 NE 1169b33-35.


10 NE1160a1-10.

11 NE 1164b23 - 1165a2.

12 NE 1165a23-25

13 NE 1156a6-8.

14 NE1157a31-34

15 See e.g. Price, Walker and Cooper in Price (1989), Cooper (1977), and Walker (1979).

16 Again we should recall that *philia* is a much wider concept that our friendship. It is more about a shared outlook on life and the worthwhile than the intimacy that we consider central in friendship.

17 NE 1380b36-1381a1. (See also Book 8.2 of the NE.)

18 Cooper (1977).

19 For something to count as friendship, also the lesser kind, there has to be a genuine interest in the other for his sake, although there is of course much less interest and less merging of lives, and less of spending time etc.

20 NE 1155b26-56a5

21 NE1162a17-a23

22 All quotes in this paragraph are from Herman (2002), in Bekoff et al.

23 At this point it is also worth pointing out that the present moral analysis merely covers how humans ought to treat animals. We by no means wish not wish to ascribe moral properties to the behaviour of
animals. Although some animals can surely be *friends* with humans, it is far from clear that these animals are full moral agents. Arguably, some animals might fulfil some of the conditions (whatever they are) for being a moral agent, but it seems highly questionable whether any non-human animal can be fully morally responsible in the sense that most humans are.
